Abstract
Smallholder farmers in developing countries often face persistent barriers to productive investment arising from fragmented landholdings, limited collateral, and risk-averse decision-making, even where agricultural cooperatives provide valued services. This article examines why locally valued cooperatives struggle to move beyond service provision to mobilise farm investment. Using a mechanism-focused case study in Vietnam, we combine a household survey (n = 52), 15 interviews, financial analysis of irrigation provision, and a review of Vietnam's 2023 Cooperative Law to examine how cooperatives can become trapped in a low-investment equilibrium. While collective irrigation generates measurable cost savings, equality-centred governance, leadership risk aversion, informal land pooling, and subsidy-dependent finance constrain capital formation. More fundamentally, modest and uncertain returns dampen incentives to invest. Governance reform, land pooling, and selective climate-linked finance emerge as conditional pathways rather than straightforward solutions, each involving trade-offs over risk, control, and distribution. Cooperative upgrading is therefore best understood as a constrained and negotiated process rather than a linear transition from service provider to investment platform.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 104269 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Journal of Rural Studies |
| Volume | 126 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Aug 2026 |
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