Fully aggregative games

Richard Cornes; Roger Hartley

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.024

Fully aggregative games

Richard Cornes^*
, Roger Hartley

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

49 Citations (SciVal)

Abstract

A game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player's own strategy and a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players. We characterize the form which this function must take in such a game and show that the game will be strategically equivalent to another game in which the function is the simple sum of strategies.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	631-633
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	116
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.024
Publication status	Published - Sept 2012

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10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.024

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title = "Fully aggregative games",

abstract = "A game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player's own strategy and a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players. We characterize the form which this function must take in such a game and show that the game will be strategically equivalent to another game in which the function is the simple sum of strategies.",

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AB - A game is fully aggregative if payoffs and marginal payoffs depend only on a player's own strategy and a function of the strategy profile which is common to all players. We characterize the form which this function must take in such a game and show that the game will be strategically equivalent to another game in which the function is the simple sum of strategies.

KW - Additive separability

KW - Aggregative games

KW - Noncooperative game theory

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Fully aggregative games

Abstract

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