'Going evaluative' to save justice from feasibility-A pyrrhic victory

David Wiens*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I discuss Gheaus' argument against the claim that the requirements of justice are not constrained by feasibility concerns. I show that the general strategy exemplified by this argument is not only dialectically puzzling, but also imposes a heavy cost on theories of justice-puzzling because it simply sidesteps a presupposition of any plausible formulation of the so-called 'feasibility requirement' and costly because it deprives justice of its normative implications for action. I also show that Gheaus' attempt to recover this normative force presupposes an epistemic dimension to the feasibility requirement that most proponents of that requirement would reject.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)301-307
Number of pages7
JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
Volume64
Issue number255
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2014
Externally publishedYes

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