Abstract
I discuss Gheaus' argument against the claim that the requirements of justice are not constrained by feasibility concerns. I show that the general strategy exemplified by this argument is not only dialectically puzzling, but also imposes a heavy cost on theories of justice-puzzling because it simply sidesteps a presupposition of any plausible formulation of the so-called 'feasibility requirement' and costly because it deprives justice of its normative implications for action. I also show that Gheaus' attempt to recover this normative force presupposes an epistemic dimension to the feasibility requirement that most proponents of that requirement would reject.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 301-307 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 64 |
Issue number | 255 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Apr 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |