Have New Zealand's political experiments increased public accountability?

New Zealand has undergone two major political reforms over the last decade, a radical restructuring of its public sector and a radical change to the electoral system. This paper examines the extent to which the reforms have improved the accountability of governments to the public. The public sector reforms have reduced the extent of political control and therefore of accountability through the political system. At the same time, within the core public service, performance contracts and strategic planning have increased political control while fears that ministerial responsibility would be weakened have proved exaggerated. Electoral reform has increased the accountability of Parliament to voters though the new system needs some fine tuning. Compulsory voting may be worth considering in the longer term. During the last nearly fifteen years, since the election of the Lange government in 1984, New Zealand has undergone a remarkable set of institutional changes, economic, political and social. All are interrelated, though they emerged at different times and in response to different problems. This paper concentrates on two changes, or sets of changes, to political institutions: the restructuring of the state sector and the transformation of the electoral system. The question posed is how successful these particular changes have been in enhancing the democratic accountability of New Zealand governments.