Hysteresis hypotheses

Alan Hájek*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This chapter assimilates the Sorites Paradox and the Preface Paradox, drawing parallels between reasoning with uncertainty and reasoning with vague concepts (a theme that Dorothy Edgington has explored). It discusses experiments in which subjects are taken along soritical series of coloured patches, displaying so-called reverse hysteresis in their responses. The chapter offers an explanation of why reverse hysteresis is rational there. It presents a variant of the Preface Paradox-the Progressive Preface Paradox-that is analogous to the Sorites Paradox and its associated experiments, and it offers an analogous explanation of why reverse hysteresis is again rational. The explanation’s central idea is that ‘belief’ is context-dependent.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationConditionals, Paradox, and Probability
    Subtitle of host publicationThemes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington
    PublisherOxford University Press
    Pages227-238
    Number of pages12
    ISBN (Electronic)9780198712732
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2021

    Cite this