Abstract
Why would Australia want nuclear weapons? Up to until just forty years ago the Australian government seriously studied the possibility of acquiring a nuclear capability. This interest declined from around 1974, due to geopolitical changes in Australia's strategic environment. These included alterations in the distribution of power, a more positive outlook for nuclear non-proliferation, which in turn seemed to "strengthen" the credibility of so-called U.S. security guarantees. How much value did policymakers attribute to U.S. extended nuclear deterrence? What were the geopolitical conditions underpinning what seemed to be a reliance on that guarantee, in lieu of a national nuclear capability? Will "reliance" on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence always be a feature of what policymakers purport to be an Australian strategic policy?
| Original language | English |
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| Pages (from-to) | 185-192 |
| Journal | Limes, Rivista Italiana Di Geopolitica (Italian Review of Geopolitics) |
| Publication status | Published - 2012 |