| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand |
| Editors | Graham Oppy and N. N. Trakakis |
| Place of Publication | Melbourne |
| Publisher | Monash University ePress |
| Pages | 1pp |
| Volume | 1 |
| Edition | 1st |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780980651201 |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Abstract
The identity theory of mind says that the mind isi.e. is identical tothe brain, and in particular that individual mental states, such as being in pain, suddenly remembering where your car keys are, or smelling a lemon, are identical to particular physical states of the brain. The theory played an important role in the development of Australian philosophy. It was formulated and defended by Australian and Australian-associated philosophers in the 1950s and 60s, in particular U. T. Place, J. J. C. Smart, D. M. Armstrong and David Lewis, and the basic principles of the theory continue to have a significant presence in Australian philosophy, for example, in the program for metaphysics set out in Jackson (1998b).