In Defence of Explanatory Ecumenism

Many of the things that we try to explain, in both our common sense and our scientific engagement with the world, are capable of being explained more or less finely: that is, with greater or lesser attention to the detail of the producing mechanism. A natural assumption, pervasive if not always explicit, is that other things being equal, the more fine00ADgrained an explanation, the better. Thus, Jon Elster, who also thinks there are instrumental reasons for wanting a more fine00ADgrained explanation, assumes that in any case the mere fact of getting nearer the detail of production makes such an explanation intrinsically superior: ‘a more detailed explanation is also an end in itself’ (Elster 1985: 5). Michael Taylor (1988: 96) agrees: ‘A good explanation should be, amongst other things, as fine00ADgrained as possible.’’.