In Defence Of Reductionism In Ethics

A version of ethical naturalism is defended against Parfit’s criticisms. The implications of the grounding of the ethical in the non-ethical and of the supervenience of the ethical on the non-ethical play major roles here. Reasons for rejecting Parfit’s triviality argument, and the related argument from real disagreement, against naturalism are given. These reasons are set in the context of discussions of how to understand what is going on when theorists debate, for example, what it takes to be the hypothesis best supported by a body of data or the nature of motion. The version of naturalism defended is a species of reductionism in ethics akin to the doctrine Parfit refers to as hard naturalism, with the difference that the version defended insists on the importance of ethical concepts. However, the author agrees with Parfit that the doctrine he calls soft naturalism is to be rejected.