In dubious battle: uncertainty and the ethics of killing

Seth Lazar*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    17 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    How should deontologists concerned with the ethics of killing apply their moral theory when we don’t know all the facts relevant to the permissibility of our action? Though the stakes couldn’t be higher, and uncertainty is endemic where killing is concerned, few deontologists have an answer to this question. In this paper I canvass two possibilities: that we should apply a threshold standard, equivalent to the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applied for criminal punishment; and that we should fit our deontological ethical theory into the apparatus of decision theory. I show that the first approach faces insurmountable obstacles, while the second holds much more promise for deontologists than they (and their critics) might first have assumed.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)859-883
    Number of pages25
    JournalPhilosophical Studies
    Volume175
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2018

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