Abstract
This chapter explores the somewhat intuitive idea that, when ranking choice options, it is reasonable to focus just on those aspects, or criteria, for which one has clear opinions about the options' relative desirability; hence aspects of choice or criteria under which the options are 'incommensurable' can simply be ignored. The exploration of this idea focuses on a form of non-dominance relation in the multi-criteria setting that is analogous to one that is appealed to in discussions of incommensurability and uncertainty. It is argued that choice principles invoking the specified non-dominance relation in the multi-criteria setting are not plausible, differing significantly from their uncertainty counterparts. Hence ignoring criteria for which options are incommensurable is not, after all, reasonable. The chapter concludes by considering how this bears on ordinary choice deliberations.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Value Incommensurability: Ethics, Risk, and Decision-Making |
| Place of Publication | New York, USA |
| Publisher | Routledge |
| Pages | 231-246 |
| Volume | 1 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-0-367-70218-2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2021 |