Indeterminate Comprehension

Jonathan A. Simon

doi:10.1002/tht3.111

Indeterminate Comprehension

Jonathan A. Simon^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Can we solve the Problem of the Many, and give a general account of the indeterminacy in definite descriptions that give rise to it, by appealing to metaphysically indeterminate entities? I argue that we cannot. I identify a feature common to the relevant class of definite descriptions, and derive a contradiction from the claim that each such description is satisfied by a metaphysically indeterminate entity.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	39-48
Number of pages	10
Journal	Thought
Volume	3
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.111
Publication status	Published - Mar 2014

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title = "Indeterminate Comprehension",

abstract = "Can we solve the Problem of the Many, and give a general account of the indeterminacy in definite descriptions that give rise to it, by appealing to metaphysically indeterminate entities? I argue that we cannot. I identify a feature common to the relevant class of definite descriptions, and derive a contradiction from the claim that each such description is satisfied by a metaphysically indeterminate entity.",

keywords = "Evans argument, indeterminate identity, metaphysical indeterminacy, problem of the many, vagueness",

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year = "2014",

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KW - metaphysical indeterminacy

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Indeterminate Comprehension

Abstract

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