Abstract
Beliefs are commonly analyzed as binary relations between subjects and propositions. Perry and Lewis have shown that the standard account has difficulties in handling self-locating beliefs. Robert Stalnaker has recently put forward a version of the standard account that is supposed to overcome this problem. Stalnaker's motivation for defending the propositional account of belief is that it comes with a simple and powerful propositional model of communication. In this paper I argue that Stalnaker's proposal fails. The only way of upholding the propositional account of belief is by abandoning the simple account of communication. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 640-663 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
| Volume | 90 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 May 2015 |
| Externally published | Yes |