Individual Coherence and Group Coherence

Rachael Briggs, Fabrizio Cariani, Kenny Easwaran, Branden Fitelson

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

    Abstract

    Paradoxes of individual coherence (e.g., the preface paradox for individual judgment) and group coherence (e.g., the doctrinal paradox for judgment aggregation) typically presuppose that deductive consistency is a coherence requirement for both individual and group judgment. This chapter introduces a new coherence requirement for (individual) full belief, and it explains how this new approach to individual coherence leads to an amelioration of the traditional paradoxes. In particular, it explains why this new coherence requirement gets around the standard doctrinal paradox. However, it also proves a new impossibility result, which reveals that (more complex) varieties of the doctrinal paradox can arise even for this new notion of coherence.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationEssays in Collective Epistemology
    EditorsJennifer Lackey
    Place of PublicationOxford, UK
    PublisherOxford University Press
    Pages217-241
    Volume1
    Edition1
    ISBN (Print)9780199665792
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014

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