Abstract
If you ought to perform a certain act, and some other action is a necessary means for you to perform that act, then you ought to perform that other action as well—or so it seems plausible to say. This transmission principle is of both practical and theoretical significance. The aim of this essay is to defend this principle against a number of recent objections, which (as I show) are all based on core assumptions of the view called actualism. I reject actualism, provide an alternative explanation of its plausible features, and present an independent argument for the transmission principle.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 921-946 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Ethics |
| Volume | 125 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 14 Jul 2015 |
| Externally published | Yes |