Intersubjectivity, deception and the 'opacity of other minds': Perspectives from Highland New Guinea and beyond

Alan Rumsey*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    21 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    How are we to understand the widely attested claim from around the world that one can never know the thoughts of another? Here I consider that question as it arises in the Ku Waru region of Highland Papua New Guinea. Drawing on evidence from three kinds of speech events, I show that the Opacity Doctrine there is less about the problem of knowing other minds than about the possibility that others might be hiding their intentions. In order to understand its consequences for everyday life, I argue for the importance of distinguishing among: (1) metapragmatic discourse about minds and intentions; (2) discourse pragmatics; and (3) the more inclusive realm of intercorporeal engagement in which 1 and 2 are grounded.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)326-343
    Number of pages18
    JournalLanguage and Communication
    Volume33
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jul 2013

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