Is belief an internal state?

Frank Jackson

doi:10.1007/s11098-005-2974-1

Is belief an internal state?

Frank Jackson^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau's interesting critique in Chapter 2 of Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, of the common view that beliefs are internal states.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	571-580
Number of pages	10
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	132
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2974-1
Publication status	Published - Feb 2007

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10.1007/s11098-005-2974-1

Cite this

@article{24565f7a4c314b37ae9e772ba632beb8,

title = "Is belief an internal state?",

abstract = "This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau's interesting critique in Chapter 2 of Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, of the common view that beliefs are internal states.",

author = "Frank Jackson",

year = "2007",

month = feb,

doi = "10.1007/s11098-005-2974-1",

language = "English",

volume = "132",

pages = "571--580",

journal = "Philosophical Studies",

issn = "0031-8116",