Abstract
According to ‘Excluders’, descriptive uncertainty – but not normative uncertainty – matters to what we ought to do. Recently, several authors have argued that those wishing to treat normative uncertainty differently from descriptive uncertainty face a dependence problem because one's descriptive uncertainty can depend on one's normative uncertainty. The aim of this paper is to determine whether the phenomenon of dependence poses a decisive problem for Excluders. I argue that existing arguments fail to show this, and that, while stronger ones can be found, Excluders can escape them.
| Original language | English |
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| Pages (from-to) | 874-899 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Pacific Philosophical Quarterly |
| Volume | 103 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2022 |