TY - JOUR
T1 - Is There a Persuasive Argument for an Inner Awareness Theory of Consciousness?
AU - Stoljar, Daniel
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V.
PY - 2023/4
Y1 - 2023/4
N2 - According to (what I will call) an inner awareness theory of consciousness, you are in a (phenomenally) conscious state only if you are aware, in some sense, of your being in the state. This theory is widely held, but what arguments are there for holding it? In this paper, I gather together in a systematic way the main arguments for holding the theory and suggest that none of them is persuasive. I end the paper by asking what our attitude to the theory should be if there is no existing argument for it.
AB - According to (what I will call) an inner awareness theory of consciousness, you are in a (phenomenally) conscious state only if you are aware, in some sense, of your being in the state. This theory is widely held, but what arguments are there for holding it? In this paper, I gather together in a systematic way the main arguments for holding the theory and suggest that none of them is persuasive. I end the paper by asking what our attitude to the theory should be if there is no existing argument for it.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85106747048&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10670-021-00415-8
DO - 10.1007/s10670-021-00415-8
M3 - Article
SN - 0165-0106
VL - 88
SP - 1555
EP - 1575
JO - Erkenntnis
JF - Erkenntnis
IS - 4
ER -