Is There a Persuasive Argument for an Inner Awareness Theory of Consciousness?

Daniel Stoljar*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    11 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    According to (what I will call) an inner awareness theory of consciousness, you are in a (phenomenally) conscious state only if you are aware, in some sense, of your being in the state. This theory is widely held, but what arguments are there for holding it? In this paper, I gather together in a systematic way the main arguments for holding the theory and suggest that none of them is persuasive. I end the paper by asking what our attitude to the theory should be if there is no existing argument for it.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1555-1575
    Number of pages21
    JournalErkenntnis
    Volume88
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2023

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