Abstract
Due to persisting demand-side factors and crumbling supply-side controls, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will probably be unable to prevent a likely proliferation rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade into the foreseeable future. Beyond being ineffective, I argue that the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous. The NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. However, abandoning the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 283-299 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Australian Journal of International Affairs |
Volume | 59 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2005 |
Externally published | Yes |