Knowledge of Perception

Daniel Stoljar

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0003

Knowledge of Perception

Daniel Stoljar^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

According to Fred Dretske' evidence argument I cannot know that that I am seeing my son (and other simple first-personal present tense psychological facts). However, since I can and do know these things, something is wrong with the evidence argument. What? I suggest that the argument overlooks a distinction between evidential and explanatory readings of its key phrases. However, I also suggest that in order to defend this diagnosis, one must acknowledge a significant element of rationality in the relevant notion of explanation. This chapter closes by comparing my proposal with an alternative.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Introspection and Consciousness
Publisher	Oxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)	9780199933396
ISBN (Print)	9780199744794
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744794.003.0003
Publication status	Published - 20 Sept 2012

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KW - Introspection

KW - Knowledge

KW - Perception

KW - Self-knowledge

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ER -

Knowledge of Perception

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