Language, thought and the epistemic theory of vagueness

Frank Jackson*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    7 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    There are borderline cases of baldness, cases where we are in principle unable to say whether or not a subject is or is not bald. According to the epistemic theory of vagueness, when X is on the borderline, 'X is bald' either is true or is false, and X either definitely is or definitely is not bald, though we cannot determine which it is. There is, that is, such a thing as the correct verdict but we cannot tell which one it is. I argue that the role of language in communicating our thought about how things are makes a strong argument against this theory.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)269-279
    Number of pages11
    JournalLanguage and Communication
    Volume22
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2002

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