Lessons from a virtual slime: marginal mechanisms, minimal cognition and radical enactivism

Lachlan Douglas Walmsley*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Radical enactivism (REC) and similar embodied and enactive approaches to the mind deny that cognition is fundamentally representational, skull-bound and mechanistic in its organisation. In this article, I argue that modellers may still adopt a mechanistic strategy to produce explanations that are compatible with REC. This argument is scaffolded by a multi-agent model of the true slime mould Physarum polycephalum.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)453-464
    Number of pages12
    JournalAdaptive Behavior
    Volume28
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2020

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