Levinas’ Anarchy, the State and International Law

This paper intends to contribute to this workshop by engaging in Emmanuel Levinas’
writings and his conception of anarchy. Levinas belongs to the generation of continental philosophers who were deeply concerned by the alienation of modernity and the terror of totalitarianism and were strongly critical about the so-called “digestive philosophy” that prioritizes ontology and removes the material and sociohistorical contingencies of political struggles. Levinas avoids the common critique that anarchism is nihilistic and simply chaotic by firmly re-anchoring the subjectivity of the self in its responsibility for the Other in a transcendental encounter. Furthermore, Levinas argues that the approach of the Other is anarchic, as the transcendental encounter is absolutely beyond premeditation and thematization. In this state of anarchy, the self is absolutely passive and vulnerable, and has no choice but to be attentive and respond to the call of the Other. As a result, the
Cartesian self is dissolved and turned inside out, but not nihilistic. Ontology becomes secondary to responsibility: subjectivity and freedom are the result of and constituted by the primordial responsibility for the Other. Bringing Levinas’ writings to international law is challenging but extremely important. International law’s traditional ontological reliance on the sovereign state is now under various challenges, most notably the challenge of human rights. Levinas’ critique on ontology can be transposed into a much principled and radical critique on the classic notion of sovereign state as the sole legitimate subject of international law. Levinas’ anarchy also invites the imagination of a Levinasian ethical state and international law which aspire to a justice-yet-to-come.