Abstract
This essay defends subjectivism about reasons of love. These are the normative reasons we have to treat those we love especially well, such as the reasons we have to treat our close friends or life partners better than strangers. Subjectivism about reasons of love is the view that every reason of love a person has is correctly explained by her desires. I formulate a version of subjectivism about reasons of love and defend it against three objections that have been made to this kind of view. Firstly, it has been argued that the phenomenology of our focus when we have reasons of love does not fit with subjectivism about those reasons. Secondly, it has been argued that the phenomenology of our motivations when we have reasons of love does not fit with subjectivism about those reasons. Thirdly, it has been argued that subjectivism about reasons of love has deeply counterintuitive implications about what our reasons of love are. I argue that none of these objections succeeds.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 591-605 |
| Journal | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue number | 3-4 |
| Early online date | 8 May 2020 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Aug 2020 |
| Externally published | Yes |