Abstract
ElectionGuard is an open source set of software components and specifications from Microsoft designed to allow the modification of a number of different e-voting protocols and products to produce public evidence (transcripts) which anyone can verify. The software uses ElGamal, homomorphic tallying and sigma protocols to enable public scrutiny without adversely affecting privacy. Some components have been formally verified (machine-checked) to be free of certain software bugs but there was no formal verification of their cryptographic security. Here, we present a machine-checked proof of the verifiability guarantees of the transcripts produced according to the ElectionGuard specification. We have also extracted an executable version of the verifier specification, which we proved to be secure, and used it to verify election transcripts produced by ElectionGuard. Our results show that our implementation is of similar efficiency to existing implementations.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Secure IT Systems |
Editors | Mikael Asplund, Simin Nadjm-Tehrani |
Place of Publication | Switzerland |
Publisher | Springer Nature |
Pages | 57–73 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-3-030-70851-1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2021 |
Event | 25th Nordic Conference Secure IT Systems - Virtual Event Duration: 1 Jan 2020 → … |
Conference
Conference | 25th Nordic Conference Secure IT Systems |
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Period | 1/01/20 → … |
Other | November 23–24, 2020 |