Malament–Hogarth Machines and Tait’s Axiomatic Conception of Mathematics

Sharon Berry

doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9571-z

Malament–Hogarth Machines and Tait’s Axiomatic Conception of Mathematics

Sharon Berry^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper I will argue that Tait’s axiomatic conception of mathematics implies that it is in principle impossible to be justified in believing a mathematical statement without being justified in believing that statement to be provable. I will then show that there are possible courses of experience which would justify acceptance of a mathematical statement without justifying belief that this statement is provable.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	893-907
Number of pages	15
Journal	Erkenntnis
Volume	79
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9571-z
Publication status	Published - 1 Aug 2014
Externally published	Yes

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title = "Malament–Hogarth Machines and Tait{\textquoteright}s Axiomatic Conception of Mathematics",

abstract = "In this paper I will argue that Tait{\textquoteright}s axiomatic conception of mathematics implies that it is in principle impossible to be justified in believing a mathematical statement without being justified in believing that statement to be provable. I will then show that there are possible courses of experience which would justify acceptance of a mathematical statement without justifying belief that this statement is provable.",

author = "Sharon Berry",

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AB - In this paper I will argue that Tait’s axiomatic conception of mathematics implies that it is in principle impossible to be justified in believing a mathematical statement without being justified in believing that statement to be provable. I will then show that there are possible courses of experience which would justify acceptance of a mathematical statement without justifying belief that this statement is provable.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84908103499

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DO - 10.1007/s10670-013-9571-z

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ER -

Malament–Hogarth Machines and Tait’s Axiomatic Conception of Mathematics

Abstract

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