TY - JOUR
T1 - Market-Based Incentives and Private Ownership of Wildlife to Remedy Shortfalls in Government Funding for Conservation
AU - Wilson, George R.
AU - Hayward, Matt W.
AU - Wilson, Charlie
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 The Authors. Conservation Letters published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
PY - 2017/7/1
Y1 - 2017/7/1
N2 - In some parts of the world, proprietorship, price incentives, and devolved responsibility for management, accompanied by effective regulation, have increased wildlife and protected habitats, particularly for iconic and valuable species. Elsewhere, market incentives are constrained by policies and laws, and in some places virtually prohibited. In Australia and New Zealand, micro economic reform has enhanced innovation and improved outcomes in many areas of the economy, but economic liberalism and competition are rarely applied to the management of wildlife. This policy perspective examines if commercial value and markets could attract private sector investment to compensate for Government underspend on biodiversity conservation. It proposes trials in which landholders, community groups, and investors would have a form of wildlife ownership by leasing animals on land outside protected areas. They would be able to acquire threatened species from locally overabundant populations, breed them, innovate, and assist further colonization/range expansion while making a profit from the increase. The role of government would be to regulate, as is appropriate in a mixed economy, rather than be the (sole) owner and manager of wildlife. Wide application of the trials would not answer all biodiversity-loss problems, but it could assist in the restoration of degraded habitat and connectivity.
AB - In some parts of the world, proprietorship, price incentives, and devolved responsibility for management, accompanied by effective regulation, have increased wildlife and protected habitats, particularly for iconic and valuable species. Elsewhere, market incentives are constrained by policies and laws, and in some places virtually prohibited. In Australia and New Zealand, micro economic reform has enhanced innovation and improved outcomes in many areas of the economy, but economic liberalism and competition are rarely applied to the management of wildlife. This policy perspective examines if commercial value and markets could attract private sector investment to compensate for Government underspend on biodiversity conservation. It proposes trials in which landholders, community groups, and investors would have a form of wildlife ownership by leasing animals on land outside protected areas. They would be able to acquire threatened species from locally overabundant populations, breed them, innovate, and assist further colonization/range expansion while making a profit from the increase. The role of government would be to regulate, as is appropriate in a mixed economy, rather than be the (sole) owner and manager of wildlife. Wide application of the trials would not answer all biodiversity-loss problems, but it could assist in the restoration of degraded habitat and connectivity.
KW - Australia and New Zealand
KW - Wildlife ownership
KW - government monopoly
KW - innovation
KW - market-based incentives
KW - off-reserve conservation
KW - proprietorship
KW - southern Africa
KW - threatened species
KW - translocation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84997171400&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/conl.12313
DO - 10.1111/conl.12313
M3 - Comment/debate
SN - 1755-263X
VL - 10
SP - 484
EP - 491
JO - Conservation Letters
JF - Conservation Letters
IS - 4
ER -