Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply

Wolfgang Buchholz*, Richard Cornes, Dirk Rübbelke

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    21 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Matching mechanisms are widely regarded as providing a promising way to cure the public good underprovision problem, but the Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium emerges only under very special conditions. However, we show that public good underprovision is normally avoided.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)727-729
    Number of pages3
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume117
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2012

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this