Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply

Wolfgang Buchholz; Richard Cornes; Dirk Rübbelke

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.095

Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply

Wolfgang Buchholz^*, Richard Cornes, Dirk Rübbelke

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Matching mechanisms are widely regarded as providing a promising way to cure the public good underprovision problem, but the Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium emerges only under very special conditions. However, we show that public good underprovision is normally avoided.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	727-729
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	117
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.095
Publication status	Published - 2012

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.095

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title = "Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply",

abstract = "Matching mechanisms are widely regarded as providing a promising way to cure the public good underprovision problem, but the Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium emerges only under very special conditions. However, we show that public good underprovision is normally avoided.",

keywords = "Matching, Pareto optimality, Public goods",

author = "Wolfgang Buchholz and Richard Cornes and Dirk R{\"u}bbelke",

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AU - Buchholz, Wolfgang

AU - Cornes, Richard

AU - Rübbelke, Dirk

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AB - Matching mechanisms are widely regarded as providing a promising way to cure the public good underprovision problem, but the Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium emerges only under very special conditions. However, we show that public good underprovision is normally avoided.

KW - Matching

KW - Pareto optimality

KW - Public goods

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84865980050

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.095

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.095

M3 - Article

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SP - 727

EP - 729

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply

Abstract

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