Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Nolan H. Miller; John W. Pratt; Richard J. Zeckhauser; Scott Johnson

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005

Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Nolan H. Miller^*, John W. Pratt, Richard J. Zeckhauser, Scott Johnson

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ε > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ε-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	476-496
Number of pages	21
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	136
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005
Publication status	Published - Sept 2007

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title = "Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations",

abstract = "We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ε > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ε-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful.",

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AU - Zeckhauser, Richard J.

AU - Johnson, Scott

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N2 - We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ε > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ε-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful.

AB - We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ε > 0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ε-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents' strategies are nearly truthful.

KW - Interdependent valuations

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Multidimensional types

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DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.005

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VL - 136

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EP - 496

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

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ER -

Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

Abstract

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