Media, fake news, and debunking

Ngo Van Long, Martin Richardson*, Frank Stähler

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We construct a modified Hotelling-type model of two media providers, each of whom can issue fake and/or real news and each of whom can invest in the debunking of their rival’s fake news. The model assumes that consumers have an innate preference for one provider or the other and value real news. However, that valuation varies according to their bias favouring one provider or the other. We demonstrate a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which only one firm issues fake news and we show, in this setting, that increased polarisation of consumers (represented by a wider distribution) increases the prevalence of both fake news and debunking expenditures and is welfare-reducing. We also show, inter alia, that a stronger preference by consumers for their preferred provider lowers both fake news and debunking. Finally, we compare monopoly and duopoly market structures in terms of ‘fake news’ provision and show that a public news provider can be welfare-improving.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)312-324
    Number of pages13
    JournalEconomic Record
    Volume95
    Issue number310
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2019

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Media, fake news, and debunking'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this