Mental Maps

Ben Blumson*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It's often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis-the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)413-434
Number of pages22
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume85
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2012
Externally publishedYes

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