Metaphysics of Consciousness

Ole Koksvik

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingEntry for encyclopedia/dictionarypeer-review

    Abstract

    Drinking a glass of cold water on a hot day feels a certain way. It is hard not to wonder why it feels that way, and indeed why it feels any way at all. In an influential and evocative way of speaking, a being is conscious just in case there is something it is like to be it (Nagel 1974). Similarly, a mental state is conscious just in case there is something it is like to be in that state. When there is something it is like to be a being, we say that that being has phenomenal experience, and when there is something it is like to be in a certain mental state, we say that that state has phenomenal properties, or a phenomenology. (This notion of consciousness contrasts with access consciousness [Block 1997], with which we shall not be concerned here.)
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationCompanion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand
    EditorsGraham Oppy and N. N. Trakakis
    Place of PublicationMelbourne
    PublisherMonash University ePress
    Pages1pp
    Volume1
    Edition1st
    ISBN (Print)9780980651201
    Publication statusPublished - 2010

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