Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand |
Editors | Graham Oppy and N. N. Trakakis |
Place of Publication | Melbourne |
Publisher | Monash University ePress |
Pages | 1pp |
Volume | 1 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Print) | 9780980651201 |
Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Abstract
Drinking a glass of cold water on a hot day feels a certain way. It is hard not to wonder why it feels that way, and indeed why it feels any way at all. In an influential and evocative way of speaking, a being is conscious just in case there is something it is like to be it (Nagel 1974). Similarly, a mental state is conscious just in case there is something it is like to be in that state. When there is something it is like to be a being, we say that that being has phenomenal experience, and when there is something it is like to be in a certain mental state, we say that that state has phenomenal properties, or a phenomenology. (This notion of consciousness contrasts with access consciousness [Block 1997], with which we shall not be concerned here.)