Minimalism and Truth Aptness

Frank Jackson; Philip Pettit; Michael Smith

doi:10.1093/oso/9780199253364.003.0012

Minimalism and Truth Aptness

Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, Michael Smith

School of Philosophy

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Abstract

Non-cognitivism in ethics holds that ethical sentences are not in the business of being either true or false-for short, they are not truth apt. No-truth theories of indicative conditionals (on one labelling of the relevant class of conditionals) hold that indicative conditionals have assertability or acceptability conditions, but not truth conditions; they are not truth apt. The arguments for these views are typically local to ethics and conditionals, respectively. They are not usually set within a specific theory of truth, and the question of how they connect to the various theories of truth is typically left unaddressed. This is surprising.’ An obvious question to ask about non-cognitivism and no-truth theories of conditionals is how they fare in the light of various views about truth.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Mind, Morality, and Explanation
Subtitle of host publication	Selected Collaborations
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	233-251
Number of pages	19
ISBN (Electronic)	9781383039337
ISBN (Print)	9780199253364
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199253364.003.0012
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2024

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Minimalism and Truth Aptness

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