Model organisms are not (theoretical) models

Arnon Levy, Adrian Currie

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    48 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Many biological investigations are organized around a small group of species, often referred to as 'model organisms', such as the fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. The terms 'model' and 'modelling' also occur in biology in association with mathematical and mechanistic theorizing, as in the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey dynamics. Whatisthe relation between theoretical models and model organisms? Are these models in the same sense? We offer an account on which the two practices are shown to have different epistemic characters. Theoretical modelling is grounded in explicit and known analogies between model and target. By contrast, inferences from model organisms are empirical extrapolations. Often such extrapolation is based on shared ancestry, sometimes in conjunction with other empirical information. One implication is that such inferences are unique to biology, whereas theoretical models are common across many disciplines. Weclosebydiscussing the diversity ofuses to which model organisms are put, suggesting how these relate to our overall account.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)327-348
    Number of pages22
    JournalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science
    Volume66
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2015

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