Moral error theories and folk metaethics

Benjamin Fraser*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    7 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In this paper, I distinguish between two error theories of morality: one couched in terms of truth (ET1); the other in terms of justification (ET2). I then present two arguments: the Poisoned Presupposition Argument for ET1; and the Evolutionary Debunking Argument for ET2. I go on to show how assessing these arguments requires paying attention to empirical moral psychology, in particular, work on folk metaethics. After criticizing extant work, I suggest avenues for future research.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)789-806
    Number of pages18
    JournalPhilosophical Psychology
    Volume27
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2014

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