Moral Functionalism

Frank Jackson*, Philip Pettit

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Sometimes we go from information couched in nonmoral terms to verdicts couched in moral terms. Sometimes we move back and forth between characterizations couched in moral terms. Sometimes our opinions about how things are, expressed in moral terms, lead us to action. Moral functionalism treats this tripartite structure of input clauses, internal role clauses, and output clauses as the key to understanding moral language. This chapter explains how moral functionalism: (i) enables the use of Ramsey sentences to account for the distinctive way in which the moral supervenes on the nonmoral; (ii) helps us understand how we learn the meanings of moral terms; (iii) explains the utility of moral language, which in turn allows us to make sense of why it evolved; (iv) helps us understand what inspires the “unifiers” in ethics, the utilitarians, for example; and (v) tells us what it takes to be a moral realist.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism
EditorsPaul Bloomsfield, David Copp
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherOxford University Press
Chapter12
Pages246-263
Number of pages18
Edition1st
ISBN (Electronic)9780190068257
ISBN (Print)9780190068226
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 18 Sept 2023

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