Moral reasoning as probability reasoning

Yiyun Shou, Fei Song

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

    Abstract

    Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to choose a deontological judgment (e.g., allowing harm) or a consequentialist judgment (e.g., doing harm) varied across different moral dilemmas. The present paper explored if the variation can be explained by the differentiation of the perceived outcome probabilities. We generated moral dilemmas that were similar to the classical trolley and footbridge dilemmas, and investigated the extent to which subjects were sensitive to the outcome probabilities. Results indicated that the majority of subjects, including both those who initially chose a deontological decision and those who initially chose a consequentialist decision could be sensitive to outcome probabilities. The likelihood of being sensitive to the probabilities was invariant across different dilemmas. The variation of the choice behaviors across different dilemmas might be associated with the variation of the estimated outcome probabilities.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationProceedings of the 37th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society
    EditorsDC Noelle, R Dale, AS Warlaumont, J Yoshimi, T Matlock, & C Jennings
    Place of PublicationAustin, USA
    PublisherCognitive Science Society
    Pages2176-2181pp
    EditionPeer Reviewed
    ISBN (Print)9780991196722
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015
    Event37th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society - Pasadena, USA
    Duration: 1 Jan 2015 → …
    https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2015/index.html

    Conference

    Conference37th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society
    Period1/01/15 → …
    OtherJuly 22-25 2015
    Internet address

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