Abstract
Previous studies found that the likelihood of subjects to choose a deontological judgment (e.g., allowing harm) or a consequentialist judgment (e.g., doing harm) varied across different moral dilemmas. The present paper explored if the variation can be explained by the differentiation of the perceived outcome probabilities. We generated moral dilemmas that were similar to the classical trolley and footbridge dilemmas, and investigated the extent to which subjects were sensitive to the outcome probabilities. Results indicated that the majority of subjects, including both those who initially chose a deontological decision and those who initially chose a consequentialist decision could be sensitive to outcome probabilities. The likelihood of being sensitive to the probabilities was invariant across different dilemmas. The variation of the choice behaviors across different dilemmas might be associated with the variation of the estimated outcome probabilities.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 37th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society |
Editors | DC Noelle, R Dale, AS Warlaumont, J Yoshimi, T Matlock, & C Jennings |
Place of Publication | Austin, USA |
Publisher | Cognitive Science Society |
Pages | 2176-2181pp |
Edition | Peer Reviewed |
ISBN (Print) | 9780991196722 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2015 |
Event | 37th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society - Pasadena, USA Duration: 1 Jan 2015 → … https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2015/index.html |
Conference
Conference | 37th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society |
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Period | 1/01/15 → … |
Other | July 22-25 2015 |
Internet address |