Moral uncertainty and permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets

Christian Barry*, Patrick Tomlin

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    11 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)898-923
    Number of pages26
    JournalCanadian Journal of Philosophy
    Volume46
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2016

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