Moralism and morally accountable beings

Craig Taylor*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    8 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In this paper I consider the nature of the purported vice of moralism by examining two examples that, I suggest, exemplify this vice: the first from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter; the second from David Owen’s account of his experience as European negotiator between the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia. I argue that in different ways both these examples show the kind of human weakness or failure that is involved in the most extreme version of moralism, a weakness that involves an inability to see or acknowledge those one seeks to judge as real, morally accountable, human beings.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)153-160
    Number of pages8
    JournalJournal of Applied Philosophy
    Volume22
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2005

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