TY - JOUR
T1 - Moralism and morally accountable beings
AU - Taylor, Craig
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2005.
PY - 2005/8/1
Y1 - 2005/8/1
N2 - In this paper I consider the nature of the purported vice of moralism by examining two examples that, I suggest, exemplify this vice: the first from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter; the second from David Owen’s account of his experience as European negotiator between the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia. I argue that in different ways both these examples show the kind of human weakness or failure that is involved in the most extreme version of moralism, a weakness that involves an inability to see or acknowledge those one seeks to judge as real, morally accountable, human beings.
AB - In this paper I consider the nature of the purported vice of moralism by examining two examples that, I suggest, exemplify this vice: the first from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter; the second from David Owen’s account of his experience as European negotiator between the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia. I argue that in different ways both these examples show the kind of human weakness or failure that is involved in the most extreme version of moralism, a weakness that involves an inability to see or acknowledge those one seeks to judge as real, morally accountable, human beings.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=65349126843&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2005.00299.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2005.00299.x
M3 - Article
SN - 0264-3758
VL - 22
SP - 153
EP - 160
JO - Journal of Applied Philosophy
JF - Journal of Applied Philosophy
IS - 2
ER -