More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

Werner Güth, Martin G. Kocher*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

227 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is a versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)396-409
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume108
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2014
Externally publishedYes

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