TY - JOUR
T1 - More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments
T2 - Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature
AU - Güth, Werner
AU - Kocher, Martin G.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2014/12/1
Y1 - 2014/12/1
N2 - Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is a versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.
AB - Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is a versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.
KW - Experiment
KW - Social preferences
KW - Ultimatum bargaining
KW - Ultimatum game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84916940550&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006
DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.006
M3 - Article
SN - 0167-2681
VL - 108
SP - 396
EP - 409
JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
ER -