Abstract
The tuna resources of the Western and Central Pacific are the world's largest and most valuable fisheries of their type and are of significant economic importance to the Pacific island countries through whose waters they migrate. Two major concerns exist with the current governance of this fishery. First, Pacific island countries receive only a small share of the resource rents from the tuna fisheries. Second, the current management structure of the fisheries will not ensure the long-term sustainability of the resources. This paper derives a model to show that the sustainability of the resource can be improved when a single policymaker acts as Stackelberg leader and sets a tax, or an equivalent quantity instrument, to maximize rents from the resource. A practical institutional mechanism is presented that mimics the model's rent maximization outcome and that offers substantial benefits to both Pacific island countries and distant water fishing nations.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 329-344 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Marine Resource Economics |
Volume | 18 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2003 |