My Philosophical Position Says ‘p’, and I Don’t Believe ‘p’

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

There is typically something strange about asserting or believing Moore- paradoxical sentences. In this paper I want to harness this strangeness to do a particular kind of philosophical work. I will argue that various prominent philosophers are committed to asserting and believing various Moore-paradoxical sentences in virtue of the very philosophical positions that they hold.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMoore's Paradox
Subtitle of host publicationNew Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person
EditorsMitchell Green, John N. Williams
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherClarendon Press
Chapter10
Pages217-231
ISBN (Print)9780199282791
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007

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