Abstract
There is typically something strange about asserting or believing Moore- paradoxical sentences. In this paper I want to harness this strangeness to do a particular kind of philosophical work. I will argue that various prominent philosophers are committed to asserting and believing various Moore-paradoxical sentences in virtue of the very philosophical positions that they hold.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Moore's Paradox |
| Subtitle of host publication | New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person |
| Editors | Mitchell Green, John N. Williams |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Clarendon Press |
| Chapter | 10 |
| Pages | 217-231 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780199282791 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 |
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