Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists

Simon Grant; John Quiggin

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(94)90143-0

Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists

Simon Grant^*, John Quiggin

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

If business managers formulate strategies in terms of mark-ups, then it is natural to think they will think of their rivals' actions in these terms. For a market characterized by constant elasticity of demand and supply, the mark-up equilibrium is derived and compared with the traditional monopoly, Cournot and perfectly competitive equilibria. We also compute the 'revenue as strategy' equilibria.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	245-251
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	45
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)90143-0
Publication status	Published - Jun 1994

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title = "Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists",

abstract = "If business managers formulate strategies in terms of mark-ups, then it is natural to think they will think of their rivals' actions in these terms. For a market characterized by constant elasticity of demand and supply, the mark-up equilibrium is derived and compared with the traditional monopoly, Cournot and perfectly competitive equilibria. We also compute the 'revenue as strategy' equilibria.",

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AB - If business managers formulate strategies in terms of mark-ups, then it is natural to think they will think of their rivals' actions in these terms. For a market characterized by constant elasticity of demand and supply, the mark-up equilibrium is derived and compared with the traditional monopoly, Cournot and perfectly competitive equilibria. We also compute the 'revenue as strategy' equilibria.

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Nash equilibrium with mark-up-pricing oligopolists

Abstract

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