National Defence, Self-Defence, and the Problem of Political Aggression

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    Abstract

    This chapter explains why one familiar and otherwise plausible approach to the justification of killing in war cannot adequately ground commonsense views of permissible national defence. Reductionists believe that justified warfare reduces to an aggregation of acts that are justified under ordinary principles of interpersonal morality. The standard form of reductionism focuses on the principles governing killing in ordinary life, specifically those that justify intentional killing in self- and other-defence, and unintended but foreseen (for short, collateral) killing as a lesser evil. Justified warfare, on this view, is no more than the coextension of multiple acts justified under these two principles. Reductionism is the default philosophical approach to thinking through the ethics of killing in war. It makes perfect sense to ask what principles govern permissible killing in general, before applying them to the particular context of war.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationThe Morality of Defensive War
    EditorsCecile Fabre & Seth Lazar
    Place of PublicationOxford
    PublisherOxford University Press
    Pages11-39
    Volume1
    Edition1
    ISBN (Print)9780199682836
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014

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