TY - JOUR
T1 - Nonclassical minds and indeterminate survival
AU - Williams Robert, J. Robert G.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 by Cornell University.
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories of mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The essay argues that Lewis's treatment of two of Parfit's puzzle cases—degreed survival and fission—presuppose different nonclassical treatments of belief and desire.
AB - Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories of mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The essay argues that Lewis's treatment of two of Parfit's puzzle cases—degreed survival and fission—presuppose different nonclassical treatments of belief and desire.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84916636810&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1215/00318108-2749710
DO - 10.1215/00318108-2749710
M3 - Article
SN - 0031-8108
VL - 123
SP - 379
EP - 428
JO - The Philosophical Review
JF - The Philosophical Review
IS - 4
ER -