Nothing to hide: Commitment to, compliance with, and impact of the special data dissemination standard

Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati*, Arusha Cooray, Samuel Brazys

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Understanding why states voluntarily cede power to international institutions, and if those institutions fulfill their stated goals, remain a pressing question in international relations. In order to evaluate the material and normative logics that may drive this type of behavior, this paper considers state commitment to and compliance with the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) initiative launched by the IMF in 1996. This effort seeks to enhance the availability of comprehensive economic data based on best dissemination practices to facilitate pursuing sound macroeconomic policies. Using panel data on 120 countries during the 1996–2011 period, we find that commitment to the SDDS occurs when costs for states are low, and that compliance with the SDDS initiative is associated with increased data transparency after controlling for self-section bias. Our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity, alternative sample, and estimation methods.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)55-77
Number of pages23
JournalEconomics and Politics
Volume30
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2018
Externally publishedYes

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