Abstract
This article discusses Barry Hindess' strangely neglected Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences and, in particular, his critical engagement there with Karl Popper. It argues that while there are some minor flaws in his interpretation, Hindess raises an issue of the greatest importance. This concerns how it can be coherent to test theories on the basis of reports on observations which are taken to have theoretical content. Shearmur suggests that a response can, indeed, be offered from a "Popperian" theory of knowledge which rejects the idea that knowledge claims can be justified, and he reports briefly on what such an approach might look like.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 32-38 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | Alternatives |
Volume | 36 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Feb 2011 |